We consider fractional linear programming production games for the singleobjective and multiobjective cases. We use the method of Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) in order to transform the fractional linear programming problems into linear programming problems. A cooperative game is attached and we prove the non-emptiness of the core by using the duality theory from the linear programming. In the multiobjective case, we give a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game, which is balanced. We also consider the cooperative game associated to an exchange economy with a finite number of agents.
INTRODUCTION
Owen considered the linear programming production problem with n producers who have m resources and cooperate in order to produce p goods. The producers' aim is the maximization of their income, which is modeled as the objective function of the discussed problem. A cooperative game is attached and the fair allocation of the income is put into question. Methods from duality theory are related to methods from cooperative games in order to prove that the core is nonempty and to find its elements. The condition of the nonemptiness of the core for a cooperative game is the balancedness, as it was proved in [bon, shapley] The seminal work of Owen has many extensions. Samet and Zemel (1984) studied the relation between the core of a given LP-game and the set of payoff vectors generated by optimal dual solutions to the corresponding linear program. Granot (1984) generalized the Owen's model so that the resources held by any subset of producers S is not restricted to be the vector sum of the resources held by the members of S. He also proved the non-emptiness of the core of the associated game. Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989) considered linear production games with committee control. Gellekom, Potters, Reijnierse, Engel and Tijs (2001) also studied linear production processes. Sakawa (1999, 2001 ) treated the multiobjective case.
In this paper, we consider that the producers want to maximize the average income on unit time, which is modeled by a fractional linear objective function. We generalize the Owen's model by introducing the fractional linear programming production games for the single-objective and multiobjective cases. The transformation of the fractional linear programming problems into linear programming problems is made by using the method of Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) . We attach a cooperative game and we prove the non-emptiness of its core. The multiobjective game is balanced, but not superaditive. For this case, we give a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game. Finally, we consider the cooperative game associated to an exchange economy with a finite number of agents.
The paper is organized in the following way: fractional linear programming production game is presented in Section 2, the multiobjective model is studied in Section 3 and the fractional linear programming production game with fuzzy parameters is the containt of Section 4.
Fractional linear programming production games

The model
A colection B of coalitions is said to be balanced if there exists γ(S) > 0 for each S ∈ B such that, for each i ∈ N, S∈B i∈S γ(S) = 1. The cooperative game (N, V ) is called balanced if for each balanced colection B,
We consider here the following model of fractional linear production game. There are m types of resurces used for the production of p goods. For each i ∈ N, the player i is endowed with a vector b i of resources, where
Any coalition S will use a total of b k (S) = i∈S b i k units of the kth resource. We assume that a unit of the jth good (j = 1, ..., p) requires a kj units of the k th resource (k = 1, ..., m). A coalition S uses all its resources in order to produce a vector (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x p ) of goods which satisfies 
The players of the coalition S want to maximize the function
, which means the average income on unit time as in Tigan [].
We will denote by
After we make the substitution (Charnes and Cooper) y = tx, t = 1 dx+d 0 , the problem (1) becomes equivalent with (2), where
Assume that x ∈ ∆ := {x : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0} implies D(x) > 0. The problem (2) can be reduced to problem (3) :
We present here several results conserning the relation between the above problems.
Theorem 1. (Schaible [,] ). Let for some ξ ∈ ∆, N(ξ) ≥ 0, if (1) reaches a (global) maximum at x = x * , then (3) reaches a (global) maximum at a point 
The associated cooperative game
We associate to the problem above the cooperative game (N, V ), where N is the set of players and V : P(N) → R, where V is defined by
where y is an optimal solution to problem P (S) and V (N) = γ(c 1 y 1 + c 2 y 2 + ... + c p y p + c 0 t), where y is an optimal solution to problem P (N) and γ > max(γ * , n) and γ * = max B S∈B γ(S), B being any balanced coalition of N.
We prove first the nonemptiness of the core of the game (N, V ). This fact is a consequence of fact that the game is balanced. Proof. Let B be a balanced colection of N. First, we have that
We notice that y j , t ≥ 0 and conclude that ( y, t) is a feasible solution for the linear problem associated to the coalition N and
Corollary 4. The core of the game (N, V ) is nonempty. Now, we find the elements of the core for the game (N, V ).
We write the primal problem (3) as
The dual of P (S) is the problem D(S), where
Since γ ≥ n, we have that
for each S ⊆ N and then,
3. Multiobjective fractional linear programming production games
The model
We prove that the game is balanced, but it is not superaditive. We give a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game.
Let n be a fixed positive integer, let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players and P(N), the set of nonempty subsets of N being the set of coalitions formed with players 1, 2, ..., n.
For each coalition S ⊆ N, define the problem P (S) :
, ...,
Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) proved that the constraint set of (5) is non-empty convex set having feasible points.
We will assume further that I C = ∅. We will use the following notations: T S = {(t, y) : (t, y) verifies the restriction of the problem (2)};
The associated cooperative game
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} and V : P (N) → R r be defined by
where γ > max(γ * , n) and γ * = max B S∈B γ(S), B being any balanced coalition of N.
The set of imputation of the game is
The problem (5) Proof. Let B be a balanced colection of N. First, we have that
Let z(y(S), t(S)) = (z 1 (y(S), t(S)), z 2 (y(S), t(S)), ..., z l (y(S), t(S))) ∈ V (S) and then, 
We notice that y, t ≥ 0 and conclude that ( y, t) ∈ V (N) and therefore
, it follows that is the game (N, V ) is balanced.
We consider the dual problem to the multiobjective linear problem in order to find a point beloging to the core. We present here some useful results concerning the duality of the multiobjective linear programming.
Let the primal and the dual problems as follows:
and respectively min g(w) = wb
We will use the following theorems.
Theorem 6. If x is a feasible solution of primal problem (7) and w is a feasible solution of dual problem (8), it is not the case that g(w) ≤ z(x).
Theorem 7.
Assume that x * is a feasible solution of primal problem (7) and w is a feasible solution of dual problem (8) . Also assume that z(x * ) = g(w * ) is satisfied. Then, x * is a Pareto optimal solution of primal problem (7), and w * is a Pareto optimal solution of dual problem (8).
Theorem 8. Considering main problem (7) and dual problem (8), the following two statements are equivalent.
(1) Each of the problems has a feasible solution. (2) Each of the problem has a Pareto optimal solution, and there exists at least a pair of Pareto optimal solutions such that z(x * ) = g(w * ).
Theorem 9. The necessary and sufficient condition for x * to be a Pareto optimal solution of primal problem (7) is that there exists a feasible solution w * of dual problem (8) such that z(x * ) = g(w * ). Then, w * itself is a Pareto optimal solution of dual problem (8) .
The next theorem gives an element of the Stable outcome.
Theorem 10. Let ω * be a Pareto optimal solution of the dual problem of the associated multiobjective linear programming problem (3) with S = N. Then the payoff u = (u 1· , u 2· , ..., u n· ) ∈ R r×n , u i· = (u i1 , u i2 , ..., u ir ) defined by u ik = 1 n ω * k1 , i = 1, 2, ..., n and k = 1, 2, ..., r belongs to the stable outcome of the game (N, V ).
Proof. We will formulate first the multiobjective linear production programming problems P (S) for each S ⊆ N equivalent to the multiobjective fractional linear production programming problems and the dual.
Let
+ } Let T S , T N be the feasible areas in the objective space of primal problems P (S), resp. P (N).
For each S N, the dual D(S) is
D(S) :
Min ωb
* and (y * , t * ) be Pareto optimal solutions for the problems D(N) and P (N).
It follows that ω
Exchange economies
We consider a pure exchange economy E = (X i , e i , U i ) i∈N with a finite number of agents, N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The commodity space is the Eu-clidean space R m . Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by her consumption set X i = R m , her initial endowment e i ∈ R m + and her utility function U i : i∈N X i → R. An allocation is an element x i ∈ R m + . An allocation x is a feasible allocation if i∈N x i ≤ i∈N e i .
Let p = mn. We will use the following notation: instead of x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) = (x 
The coefficients a ij (S) are defined as follows.
.., m − 1} and k ∈ S; 0 if j ∈ (k − 1)m + i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., m − 1} and k / ∈ S; 1 if j = km and k ∈ S; 0 if j = km and k / ∈ S. for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., m} and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., p}. We will attach the following cooperative game (N, V ) to the economy E,
where γ > max(γ * , n) and γ * = max B S∈B γ(S), B being any balanced coalition of N, T S = {(t, y) : (t, y) verifies the restrictions of the problem (3)}; T S = {z ∈ R m : z = (tN i ( y t )) i∈{1,2,...,m} , (t, y) ∈ T s }. We obtain the following results. Proof. Let B be a balanced colection of N. First, we have that
for each k ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}. Let z(y(S), t(S)) = (z 1 (y(S), t(S)), z 2 (y(S), t(S)), ..., z l (y(S), t(S))) ∈ V (S) and then,
Assume that (y(S), t(S)) ∈ D S . We have that A(S)y(S) ≤ t(S)b(S) and A(N)y(S) ≤ t(S)b(N) for each S ∈ B, Theorem 12. Let ω * be a Pareto optimal solution of the dual problem of the associated multiobjective linear programming problem (3) with S = N. Then the payoff u = (u 1· , u 2· , ..., u n· ) ∈ R n×n , u i· = (u i1 , u i2 , ..., u in ) defined by u ik = 1 n ω * k1 , i = 1, 2, ..., n and k = 1, 2, ..., n belongs to the stable outcome of the game (N, V ).
Let p = nm, c ′ ∈ R n×(p+1) , A ′ ∈ R (n+2m)×(p+1) and b ′ ∈ R n+2m be defined Max c ′ (y, t) (y, t) ∈ T p = {(y, t) : A ′ (S)(y, t) = b ′ , (y, t) ∈ R p+1 + } and P (N) :
Max γc ′ (y, t) (y, t) ∈ T p = {(y, t) : A ′ (S)(y, t) = b ′ , (y, t) ∈ R p+1 + } Let T S , T N be the feasible areas in the objective space of primal problems P (S), resp. P (N).
For each S N, the dual D(S) is
D(S) :
Min ωb ′
